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Abstract 
 
This article addresses the status of the fact in literary and historical discourses in late colonial 
Korea, focusing on the elaboration of the relationship between scientific and literary truths 
primarily in the work of philosopher and critic Sŏ Insik (1906–?). It points to a growing tendency 
in late 1930s and early 1940s Korea to question the veracity of the fact (or of empiricism more 
broadly) in an environment where the enunciation of the colonial subject had been rendered 
problematic and objective statements had arguably lost their connection with social reality. In a 
period when the relationship between signifier and referent had come into question, how did this 
major critic understand the relationship between science and literature, or between truth and 
subjectivity? Sŏ warns against a simplistic apprehension of the notion of truth as unilaterally 
equivalent with what he calls “scientific truth” (kwahakchŏk chilli)—a nomological truth based 
on objective observation and confirmation by universal principles—and argues that a necessary 
complement to apparently objective truth is “literary truth” (munhakchŏk chinsil). Against the 
fixed, conceptual form of scientific thought, literary truth presents itself as an experiential truth 
that returns to the sensory world of the sociolinguistic subject (chuch’e) as a source of credibility. 
 
Keywords: literary history, colonial discourse, colonial modernity, factuality, science, scientific 
truth, Sŏ Insik, late colonial Korea 
 
 
Against the positivism which halts at phenomena—“There are only facts”— 
I would say: no, facts are just what there aren’t, there are only interpretations. 
 
—Friedrich Nietzsche 
 
Introduction 
Much work on colonial modernity has turned its attention to discourse, to the rules external to 
language that dictate when, where, and by whom it may be spoken or written, and to the rules 
internal to language that determine how it is classified and ordered (Foucault 1972, 216, 220). In 
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grappling with not only how language might reflect social or political life in its form or content 
but also how language might aggregate to itself the power to act in the world, this thoughtful 
consideration of discourse—of the importance and complexity of language under colonial rule—
has been effective in moving beyond the often polarized political possibilities that characterized 
earlier studies of the period in Korea. 
As Ch’a Sŭnggi has pointed out, one of the most influential examples of discourse linked 
to the rise of both modernity and colonialism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was that 
of science. Science occupied a privileged position in colonial discourse, identified with (or even 
seen as identical to) modern civilization. Ch’a writes, “It is no exaggeration to say that a 
generalized scientific understanding reigned as the method with most authority in its 
‘knowledge’ of the world and humankind.” Science provided an expanded explanatory power, a 
capacity to analyze and classify in both natural and social worlds, and in the process became its 
own ideology of expansion (2012, 9–10). 
At the same time, science as a concept signified differently in different periods. Ch’a 
argues that, during the so-called enlightenment period (late nineteenth to early twentieth 
centuries), science functioned as a world view, a new way of apprehending and ordering the 
world; in contrast, during the colonial period and the rise of capitalism in the colony, science was 
understood primarily as a method, one that subsequently developed into a techno-instrumentalist 
sensibility characterizing the period of imperialization and total war—the penetration of the self 
and the social by scientific understanding and the instrumentalization of human life (8). We 
might identify these as stages: first, the discovery of the real (characterized by a movement from 
fantasy to real, from premodern spirits to early-modern heroes, a period in which the real became 
the “absolute ground” of knowledge of the world); second, the manipulation or rationalization of 
the real (the commodification and instrumentalization of nature); and third, with the penetration 
of that techno-instrumentalist logic into human relations and self-understanding, a loss of the 
real—a loss that, as Ch’a notes, was at the root of the familiar subjective split of modernity, the 
crisis consciousness that accompanied the onset of the modern. 
The complicity between discourses of science and empire in structuring the colonial 
relation is well known. Modern science has been “widely considered a purely West European 
creation” (Raj 2007, 1); further, “the idea that science and technology were among the gifts that 
Western imperial powers brought to their colonies was an integral part of the discourse of the 
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‘civilizing mission,’ one vaunted by both proponents and critics of the methods of colonialism” 
(Seth 2009, 373). As Suman Seth points out, the language of science—so closely linked with 
modernity and the imperial project—served to express a common interest among colonial elites 
and imperialist officials. Yet it is also important to recognize that the discourse of factual science 
had the potential to call into question epistemological limits and thus the content of the real 
itself: 
Historical actors’ attempts to get “full, precise, and accurate facts” often 
undermined and transformed many of the assumptions that brought them to the 
continent in the first place. Experts’ emphasis on accuracy, in other words, called 
into question at significant junctures the limits not only of the ways they pursued 
knowledge, but also the very content of that knowledge. (Tilley 2005, 247)1 
 
Key to this discussion of science, then, is the category of the real and its relation to 
discourse. Julia Adeney Thomas observes that, amid Foucault’s well-known focus on discursive 
formations, he also acknowledged a prediscursive reality—“the enigmatic treasure of ‘things’ 
anterior to discourse”—and she takes up the problem of the gap between the discursive and the 
prediscursive or nonlinguistic in her essay on photography and the practice of history (2009, 
153).2 The photograph appears to offer “immediate access to past realities” and is often treated as 
a form of “unmediated recognition.” Yet Thomas maintains that the photograph withholds full 
knowledge, remains enigmatic, and must be dealt with as (borrowing Joan Scott’s words) “an 
interpretation that needs to be interpreted” (151). The photograph begins to make sense only 
when read in light of the “discursive and material whole out of which it emerged” (153), that 
“regular formation of objects” that appears only in discourse (Foucault 1972, 47). Thomas posits 
two approaches to objects like photographs that appear to offer such immediate access to reality: 
precognitive “recognition” and interpretive “excavation.”3 
Under a regime of scientific thought, factuality is that which is treated as an unmediated 
point of access to the real. Yet the fact came under contention in 1930s and early 1940s colonial 
Korea, when facticity—the “fact of facts”—became embedded in a network of interpretation, a 
network that moved the fact from a reality “anterior to discourse” to one structured by language, 
the medium of understanding and interpretation. Here, the fact—or scientific knowledge more 
generally—did not provide easy access to reality, but instead worked to raise the question of how 
people know what they know. Facts appear at certain times and places and are assigned 
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meaning—become part of the “regular formation of objects”—in language, and in language 
those facts become malleable in a way that calls into question an essential objectivity. 
What might this apparent malleability of knowledge of the world have meant for cultural 
production in late colonial Korea? The nature of the connection between literature and reality, 
though not a new question, has been central to literary history in Korea since the early twentieth 
century, and I have written elsewhere on the “crisis of representation” that stemmed from the 
contentious relationship between language and the real in 1930s literary theory and practice 
(Hanscom 2013). At the same time, beyond how the idea of the real functioned in terms of 
literary practice and history, it is also important to think about these debates at the level of social 
discourse, linking “how things might be known” with “what must or should be known” and 
attempting to understand the role of culture in the active propagation of certain knowledge, or 
forms of knowing. 
Following an introduction to the debates around “facticity” in late 1930s colonial Korea, 
then, I read the work of critic and philosopher Sŏ Insik (1906–?) as an attempt to retheorize the 
individual experience of social fact in the context of Japanese empire, considering specifically 
the capacity (or incapacity) of language to deliver truth. Sŏ was a practicing Marxist-Leninist 
and an activist in the Korean Communist Party during the late 1920s and early 1930s. He was a 
leading presence in the intellectual circles of the late 1930s and early 1940s, closely associated 
with Ch’oe Chaesŏ and the journal Liberal Arts Critique.4 Sŏ’s definition of the role of literature 
and concomitant emphasis on the derivation of truth in language comes at the end of the 1930s, 
in the midst of an increasingly harsh period of colonial rule guided by a policy of imperialization. 
At this moment in history, Koreans were compelled to adopt Japanese names, to forgo the use of 
the Korean language in both public and private life, and to speak and write under an increasingly 
intolerant censorship. This repression was accompanied by discourses of a “New East Asian 
Order” (Tonga sin chilsŏ), which proposed a unification of the region in economic, social, 
political, and cultural terms. This unification promised equality even as it established Japan as 
the hegemonic center, and was consequently a typically paradoxical colonial discourse that relied 
on indeterminacy to perpetuate its legitimacy. Sŏ thus raised the question of representational 
truth at a time when concepts of both truth and language were under crisis in multiple fields of 
social reality. 
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Science is treated in this article—as it is in Sŏ’s critique—not as an unmediated form of 
knowledge but as a phenomenon that gives us occasion to consider the importance of language in 
the analysis of the imperial context and to expand on the relationship between scientific, literary, 
and colonial discourses. In examining the discussion of fact and scientific knowledge in the work 
of authors, critics, and thinkers of the period, I aim to question not only the fact in relation to 
language and culture, but also methods of interpretation that implicitly accept a reality taken to 
be identical with itself—whether natural, social, racial, national, or other—posited by the 
seemingly neutral and objective language of science. 
 
Facticity: The Fact of Facts5 
The representation of things as they are (sasil 寫實), and the place of the fact (sasil 事實) 
within that representation, came to the fore in debates around the veracity of the historical fact 
(sasil 史實) or the fact of facts—facticity—in the late 1930s and early 1940s.6 Key articles by 
well-known critics (Ch'oe 1938; Im 1938; Paek 1938) carried the discussion forward; the very 
controversy around the concept of the fact “gives us the sense of a situation in which the 
confidence of the subject [chuch’e] and belief in the forward development of history was 
shaken” (H. Yi 2006, 220). Particularly in the 1930s, following the Japanese invasion of China 
and the institution of a total war system at home and in the colonies, 
 
A positive response to reality [hyŏnsil] was no longer possible…. Intellectuals 
came to fundamentally question the accepted “development” of history. This was 
of necessity accompanied by a fundamental questioning of progress [chinbo], and 
gave rise to doubts regarding a lucid rationality, the subject’s [subjective] 
perception of reality.7 (H. Yi 2006, 221) 
 
With imperialization, “attempts to grasp in literature the totality of real relations through realism 
were impeded, and this resulted in a change of direction as far as ‘scientific understanding’” was 
concerned, Ch’a Sŭnggi writes. “What emerged was a situation of acute doubt as to the authority 
secured by science and a scientific understanding of reality,” especially in the realms of literature 
and culture (2012, 32). The breakdown of the mentality that had maintained Europe’s claim to 
universality—a system based on a scientific spirit or order—led to a “crisis consciousness” under 
Japanese empire (33). More broadly, this can be linked to what Allan Megill calls the collapse, 
or “death,” of historicism and the “faith in progress that was the widely diffused, vulgarized form 
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of historicism”—a “growing awareness of the flux and multiplicity of history, and a growing 
consciousness of the subjectivity of its apprehension” (1985, xii– xiii).8 
 Paul Valéry’s idea of a “century of fact”—which had become a catchphrase in 1930s 
colonial Korea—took this crisis as indicating an uncertain, “tangled” reality in which no fixed 
meaning was possible, a “tissue of multiple threads…[that] no one can any longer trace…to their 
origins or understand the tug of their meaning” (1962, 217).9 As Valéry writes in his 1926 essay 
“The Persian Letters: A Preface,” the fact—which he associates with barbarism and the “mere 
coercion of bodies by bodies”—declines with the emergence of the “reign of order,” an order of 
symbols and signs, “a conjured edifice…founded on writing, an obedience to words” (215–216). 
This, in turn, signals the emergence of an era characterized by its distance from primitive 
necessities (218). Even as he satirizes this contemporary “reign of fiction,” with its “unlimited 
exercise of speech unrelated to action,” Valéry warns of a potential return to an era of fact, an era 
in particular of scientific fact, and asks whether society can maintain its coherence in the face of 
a factual logic of precision, “relying only on what is measurable and verifiable” (218). 
It was around the concept of the fact that issues of subjectivity, history, language, and 
truth also coalesced in colonial Korea. The diminished power of the subject to apprehend, 
understand, and represent reality (in language) and the arbitrarily selective nature of history, in 
combination with the simplistic imposition of models of identity in the colonial context, 
produced a deep skepticism toward the certainty of prediscursive knowledge that factuality 
implied. At the same time the late colonial period was an era during which—in Valéry’s words—
one was not “still free to doubt what is doubtful and to maintain what is not” (1962, 3). Ch’oe 
Chaesŏ leads off his 1938 article on the “Century of the Fact” with Valéry’s use of this phrase, 
singling out the French intellectual’s expression of a distrust of history, a denial of historical 
objectivity. As Valéry writes in his 1932 “Historical Fact,” the historian has no choice but to 
 
choose, that is, agree not only on the existence but also on the importance of the 
fact…. Men can believe only what seems to them least tainted with humanity…. 
But since we cannot retain everything, and since we have to free ourselves from 
the infinitude of facts by judging their relative interest for the future, the decision 
on importance inevitably reintroduces into the historical work the very thing we 
had just tried to eliminate. (1962, 121, emphases in original) 
 
Hanscom 33 
 
Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review 
E-Journal No. 10 (March 2014) • (http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-10) 
 
For Valéry, what was called “history” was no more than an accumulation of “facts”—“it was 
through the subject of history that facts were selected and arranged [into a narrative]—thus what 
was called the objectivity of history could not be guaranteed” (H. Yi 2006, 220).10 A “pure 
history, history composed of facts only,” he writes, “is quite pointless, for facts by themselves 
have no meaning. From time to time, someone says to you: ‘This is a fact. You must bow before 
the fact.’ What he is trying to say is: ‘You must believe …you must believe because man has had 
nothing to do with it. It is things themselves speaking. It is a fact” (Valéry 1962, 123–124).11 
Even beyond Valéry’s point that one has to “do” something with facts (select, arrange, prioritize, 
and so on), the introduction of facts into language (facticity) already undermines the idea of a 
purely objective knowledge or historical practice. 
Yi Hyŏnsik identifies leftist critic An Hamgwang12 as one who responded to this newly 
mythologized nature of factitious discourse by proposing a “spirit of fact” (sasil chŏngsin), a 
mentality that did not discard the logic of the fact, but that remained constantly aware that facts 
existed within a dialectic between subject and object (An 1939). Yi remains critical of An’s 
perspective, however, on the grounds that in order for the subject of history to attain this “spirit,” 
not only are certain underlying concepts assumed (objective truth, historical necessity, 
universality, and so on), but the entire burden of apprehending factual history is placed on the 
same subject. “The problem is that [An] doesn’t explain whether or not one must be within [or 
without] this subject-object dialectical relation with reality in order for the subject to attain this 
spirit of fact” (H. Yi 2006, 223)—a problem I take up below in Sŏ Insik’s work on the place of 
the subject in knowledge production. 
Another thinker cited by Ch’oe Chaesŏ in the 1938 article mentioned above is French 
philosopher and novelist Julien Benda (1867–1956), in particular his 1928 work The Treason of 
the Intellectuals. How, Ch’oe asks, is “fact” to be utilized in leading humankind? “Intellectuals 
who relax in [their responsibility to] address this serious problem commit the sin that Julien 
Benda spoke of” (Ch’oe 1938, 5). This “crime” is the turn of the intellectual away from 
disinterested considerations of the universal and transcendent and toward the material and 
particular interests of “political passions”—racial, class, and national hatreds particular to the 
modern period. Intellectual theorizing of these passions tends toward two directions, both of 
which fall for Benda under the “cult of fact”: the claim that a certain politics is in line with “the 
development of evolution” or the inevitable “unrolling of history” (that is, the discovery of 
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“historical laws” that support a particular political position); and the claim that a particular 
political ideology is founded on science, is “the result of a ‘precise observation of facts’” (Benda 
[1928] 2009, 28).13 That is, the intellectuals’ “treason” found both a nomological and scientific 
basis for its claims—both of which are grounded precisely in a factitious understanding of reality 
and an abandonment of any consideration of the relationship between (historical, scientific) facts 
and the subjective expression of those facts in language.14 
Accordingly, we can observe three things here: first, that the expression of the real came 
under intense scrutiny in the late colonial period, particularly in the concept of the fact and its 
role in science, politics, and history; second, that a systematic understanding of the subject’s 
relation to that real and to language was seen as necessary in order to theorize not only the 
critique of historical objectivity and scientific discourse, but also the place of the intellectual in 
relation to the sociopolitical developments that rendered the relationship between the real and its 
expression suspect; and third, as we will see below, that in this uncertain context of crisis 
literature could be understood as a technique or practice capable of both expressing the relation 
between subjective experience and factual knowledge (“actuality”) and returning the fact of that 
relation to subjective knowledge. 
 
Truth in Literature: Sŏ Insik’s Late Colonial Writings on Literary Ethics 
Sŏ Insik, a leading critic and philosopher of the period, expressed the gap between fact 
and subjective experience as a question of ethics. Using Hegelian terms, he theorized the 
experience of the social as a dialectic between individual morality (Moralität), especially as 
linked with feeling or emotion (Gemüt), and formal society (Sittlichkeit). According to Sŏ, there 
are two approaches to thinking about ethics: 
 
First, as a social-collective body, we speak of all the social methods and 
regulations, the social order which disciplines the attitudes and actions of humans 
in their relations with one another; secondly, we have an individual’s subjective-
expressive stance toward these various social regulations and order…. Ethics can 
thus only be within the limits of …what is commanded and what should be. 
Therefore, at the limits of what we can say regarding ethics, we must be 
concerned with these two aspects: on the one hand, the ethical order, Sittlichkeit 
[yulli ŭi kwansŭpsŏng] and on the other hand, ethical morality, Moralität [yulli ŭi 
simchŏngsŏng]. (1940, 12) 
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Sittlichkeit refers to institutionalized convention, social patterns, and norms (tradition, custom, 
laws, etiquette, culture, and so on), that “force of unvarying direction, which is to the soul what 
force of gravity is to the body, ensur[ing] the cohesion of the group by bending all individual 
wills to the same end” (Bergson [1932] 1935, 255).15 Opposed to the particular and nomothetic 
character of Sitte, “morality” is at once universal and individual, a linear-centrifugal force 
counteracting the centripetal force of custom and convention. Whereas Sitte is the ethics of an 
ethnos or class, Moralität is a universal ethics of the human being (Sŏ 1940, 13).16 
This duality helps to define the subject beyond the individual, in that the self only 
becomes a “developed unity” through entrance into the social, as the social and the individual are 
understood as mutually defining (Regev 2005, 588; Bergson [1932] 1935, 7). While constant 
tension between individual will and social order conditions this process of mutual definition, the 
relation may also arrive at a moment in which the “sublation of the individual to the whole” 
ceases, and significant conflict emerges, with the “division of the content and form of ethics, the 
historical and the human, the particular and the universal, substance and subjectivity into 
elements of abstract opposition” (Sŏ 1940, 16). Within this disjunction, as the centrifugal force 
of humanity intensifies against the centripetal force of the social, “the ethical norms and order 
that promoted the smooth progress of humanity cannot but be transformed into shackles on that 
development of humanity [ingansŏng]. An ethics which arrives at this stage of conflict with 
humanity has necessarily already lost its…subjectively human truth [chinsilsŏng]”: 
 
If we refer to “historical rationality” as that which possesses a concretely 
universal character, the particular split from the universal cannot but become 
something irrational; if we refer to “human truth” [chinsilsŏng] as subjective truth 
[chuch’ejŏgin chinsil] then it would not be wrong to say that a substance broken 
away from subjectivity—a history disjointed from humankind—would be 
something untruthful. To repeat: an already-existing [social] ethics, as it loses its 
ethical truth [chin], is merely a skeletal ruin bereft of true ethicality. (Sŏ 1940, 
16)17 
 
 Assimilatory colonization involves just such a disjunction between “historically rational” 
truth and the subjective experience of that truth by both colonized and colonizer. Sŏ complicates 
the mediating role of culture by asking in what form this “uncertainty” might be expressed in 
literature. How might the form and content of the work of art reflect the conflict between the 
social frame and the individual subject? Key to Sŏ’s theorization of late colonial society is its 
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organic and dialectical integration of the ethical and the moral, the social and the individual. As 
we will see, it is finally literature’s role to express the “ethical truth” of a particular social 
formation, the expression of the relationship of the individual to that society. What concept of 
truth needs to be operative for this statement to make sense? And what for Sŏ is the relationship 
between this truth and language, between the expression of truth and the perceived fallibility of 
the prediscursive fact in late colonial Korea, a time when an unproblematic scientific approach to 
history and literature had come into question? 
 
From Scientific Fact to Literary Truth 
In 1940, Sŏ asked the readers of Liberal Arts Critique—one of two major literary 
journals in late colonial Korea—whether it was possible for literature to seek after and represent 
anything less than the truth itself. Opening with the well-known quotation from Aristotle’s 
Poetics that distinguishes poetry from history as a mode of understanding, Sŏ argues that the 
value of literature as a path toward understanding lies in its capacity to represent truth (chin).18 
“The object of understanding [insik] is, in general terms, an inquiry into the truth of phenomena 
[sasang],” he writes. “There is, in understanding, no other function apart from the operation of 
judging and discerning between the truth and falsity of phenomena” (1940, 7).19 
Following the assertion that understanding, whether historical or literary, functions solely 
to discern between the truth and falsity of objects or events in the world, Sŏ quickly warns the 
reader away from a simplistic apprehension of this notion of truth as unilaterally equivalent with 
what he calls “scientific truth” (kwahakchŏk chilli), a nomological truth based on objective 
observation and confirmation by universal principles.20 For Sŏ, a necessary complement to 
objective, scientific truth is “literary truth” (munhakchŏk chinsil). Against the fixed, conceptual 
form of scientific truth, literary truth presents itself as an experiential truth that returns to the 
sensory world of the sociolinguistic subject (chuch’e) as a source of credibility (Sŏ 1940, 8). The 
non-Euclidean geometrical proposition of parallel lines that cross cannot, for instance, be 
experienced as real (chinsil), but the truthfulness (chilli) of the proposition cannot be denied. 
These two concepts of truth are immanently related—chilli and chinsil each refer to a 
truth (chin) anterior to discourse, what Sŏ calls the “truth of actuality” (sasil ŭi chin). At the 
same time, this truth (chin) is the product of a dialectical movement between objective and 
subjective truths, the “logical relation of mutual negation and subsumption” (Sŏ 1940, 9). 
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Whereas chilli as a universal form of truth denies the individuality and contingency of each 
particular case of experiential chinsil, presenting formal concepts of necessary and objective 
relations that describe and coordinate the multiplicity of subjective realities, chinsil negates 
chilli’s abstract universality and returns truth to the realm of subjective actuality, unifying 
objective truth with the concrete everyday experience of the actuality that it claims to describe. 
As chinsil sublates chilli, it presents a higher level of truth that contains the truth of the scientific 
within itself, elevating abstract truth into a “human truth” (inganjŏk chinsil) in the production of 
the literary text. 
Sŏ’s conceptualization of truth as consisting of a dialectic between objective and 
subjective elements is clearly a Hegelian one, the replacement of an either/or decision between 
truth and falsity with an organic unity in which truth supplants falsity, only to be supplanted by a 
higher truth. What is interesting about Sŏ’s treatment of this dialectic is that it assigns to 
literature, rather than to philosophy, the responsibility of expressing—carrying out in language—
the movement of truth.21 The representation of truth falls on the shoulders of the author who 
must, in his or her writing, practice the unification of the objective concepts that structure the 
prevailing ethos of his or her time with a depiction of the subjective experience of those customs 
(kwanhaeng)22 that structure everyday life. Nor does the author stand outside of these customs, 
laws, habits, social norms, and so on—it is precisely his or her involvement in and experience of 
the life of this period that yields a feeling or sense of morality (simchŏng) in the author at odds 
with the historical essence of his or her era (Sŏ 1940, 18–19).23 The author is the figure who is 
capable of exceeding the mere reflection of reality suggested in Sŏ’s scientific truth and 
synthesizing that (received) truth with a subjective experience of a complex and contradictory 
reality. 
Truth, in both its subjective and objective manifestations, relates to what is actual (sasil), 
the reality that both preexists and is revealed by the dialectical movement of thought and the 
expression of that thought in language. Another way to think about Sŏ’s division of truth into 
two related elements, then, is in terms of the relationship that obtains between those elements 
and the supposed ontological ground of actuality itself. Scientific knowledge elevates itself 
above reality, separating itself from every subject and basing its monological, impersonal 
assertions regarding the truth of the real on formal principles, while experiential knowledge is 
based on immersion in the everyday, a subjective and dialogical engagement with the real (Sŏ 
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1940, 8). Experiential or subjective truth appears in (grammatically) personal statements, while 
objective truth appears in the form of impersonal propositions, as scientific thought attempts to 
separate itself from the subjective realm and present the object unhindered by raw experience, 
emotion, the entanglements of human relationships, and so on. 
This latter form of knowing is what Alexandre Kojève calls vulgar science, “carried out 
by a Subject who pretends to be independent of the Object, and…[that] is supposed to reveal the 
Object which exists independently of the Subject” ([1969] 1980, 176). Heidegger calls it material 
truth, “the consonance of something at hand with the ‘rational’ concept of its essence,” which 
consequently appears as “immediately intelligible” or logical ([1967] 1998, 139). When we 
speak of truth in general, Heidegger writes, we most often mean the “actual,” a “genuineness” 
that “is in accordance [in der Übereinstimmung steht] with what, always and in advance, we 
‘properly’ mean” by whatever it is we are seeking the truth of (137). 
While Sŏ’s argument does not discount a rational order to the world, he identifies both 
scientific and literary truths as modes of speech: “The expression of [scientific] truth in speech is 
its appearance through impersonal propositions…while the expression of [subjective] truth in 
speech is its coming into being through personal propositions” (1940, 8). The difference between 
scientific and literary truths is thus not one of a material, lawful, necessary truth against a 
subjective propositional truth, but rather rests in the relationship between types of propositions 
and the reality they attempt to communicate. While material truth can thus be seen as the accord 
of “a matter with what is supposed in advance regarding it,” propositional truth lies in “the 
accordance of what is meant in the statement with the matter” at hand (Heidegger [1967] 1998, 
138).24 
In positioning both objective and subjective truths in terms of the propositional, Sŏ 
highlights the dependence of each form of truth on the other and on language rather than letting 
the matter rest at a preliminary stage where truth is essentially equated with common sense—an 
accord with that which is already known to begin with. Both objective and subjective truths 
potentially reserve an “unsaid” for Sŏ, something that requires or appears to require 
interpretation (understanding) to take place. That is, both truths are discursively constituted. On 
the one hand, if subjective truth is absent from scientific truth, science remains disconnected 
from actuality; on the other hand, if subjective truth has relinquished all association with the laws 
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that appear to govern physical or social reality, that subjective truth is equally disconnected from 
actuality: 
 
Truth [chilli] is a truth of actuality; the real [chinsil] too is a truth of actuality. 
Thus chilli and chinsil cannot but have some necessary immanent relation. To say 
it again, a truth that does not underwrite the real cannot be a truth of superior 
meaning; and a real that does not imply a truth cannot be a real of true meaning 
[ch’am taun ŭimi]. A literary truth [chinsil] must at root necessarily correspond 
with scientific truth [chilli] as [modes of] understanding [insik] of the same actual 
[sasil]. (Sŏ 1940, 9) 
 
Scientific and literary truths both function as propositional truths—truths that are “the 
accordance…of a statement…with a matter” (Heidegger [1967] 1998, 140)—differing only in 
their stances vis-à-vis an actuality shared between the two modes of understanding. Further, the 
relationship between fact, truth, and the (subjective) real is a dialectical one: “experiential 
actuality, scientific truth, and literary truth,” Sŏ writes, “have a logical relation of mutual 
negation and subsumption.”25 
Sŏ Insik thus provides a theorization of truth that extends the mid-1930s critique of realist 
discourse and engages in the debates around facticity. He maintains that any representation of the 
experiential real must imply a kernel of scientific truth, and that while subjective truth and 
objective truth characterize reality in different ways, it is only in the sublation of these two 
particular truths that a concretely universal, ethical, “human truth” may be arrived at. In this 
sense, he insists that material reality (sasil) contains the essential truth (chin) common to both 
subjective and objective truths—a prediscursive reality. 
At the same time, the dialectical nature of truth necessarily includes the subjective and 
the role of that subject’s expression. Accordingly, Sŏ’s discourse on truth can be understood as 
undermining an empiricist imperial discourse, a discourse confident in technologies of knowing 
and seemingly unaware of subjective biases and narrative techniques at work in the production of 
historical, political, biological, and other forms of knowledge. Sŏ provides us with a 
philosophical accounting of the dialectical relationship between individual and society or subject 
and system that is not fundamentally limited to a defense of empire. 
In addition, the action of truth here provides a structural homology with the social in Sŏ’s 
thought, a formal connection between the individual and the social that brings them together in 
the ethical. “What is called ‘truth’ [chin] in ethics carries the meaning of, precisely, human truth 
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[inganjŏk chinsil],” Sŏ writes, “a subjective truth [chuch’ejŏk chinsil]. Isn’t then ‘literary truth,’ 
after which literature seeks, also this subjective human truth?” “There is thus,” he continues, “no 
difference between the truth after which literature seeks and ethical truth. To say it again: the 
object that literature engages is not only moralistic actuality [illyunchŏk sasil] but it seeks as well 
an ethical truth” (1940, 11–12). What is the role of the intellectual or artist in such a context? 
When society or culture is split by a radical disjuncture between collective Sitte and individual 
Moralität, how is consciousness manifested and understanding reached in a work of art? What 
can a “human ethics” mean under policies of imperialization in late colonial Korea? 
 
In Crisis, the Ethical Role of Literature 
According to Sŏ, during a period in which social “custom” and individual “feeling” are in 
perfect harmony, writing will express an author’s own morality; insofar as this coincides with the 
prevailing social morality, the resulting literature will express the ethical truth of his or her social 
formation. Such an author would have no reason to be distrustful of the time in which he or she 
lived. 
 
There would be no reason for a consciousness of one’s eccentric existence 
[isimchŏk saengjon] with regard to their era to arise in an author with no such 
skepticism…. In a word, literature’s presentation of the ethical truth of such an 
era and such a society would perhaps not be as difficult as it is in the present age. 
(Sŏ 1940, 15) 
 
Here the homology between the social (the dialectic of Sitte and Moralität) and the 
epistemological (the dialectic of chilli and chinsil) becomes evident in the function of literary 
language. If the task of literature is to express the truth of one’s era, the author will, in 
harmonious times, simply express his or her own sense of truth, as this will exist in organic 
synthesis with social mores. On the other hand, in a “difficult” time, such as the late colonial 
period, a period of crisis26 when the social has become a “shackles” on humankind, what we see 
in literature is “a distorted humanity which has lost the balance and harmony of flesh and spirit, 
psychology [mind] and behavior [haengdong], intellect and sentiment, individuality and sociality” 
(Sŏ 1940, 17). 
Sŏ depicts modern society as similar to Valéry’s “reign of order”—the “era of fiction” 
with its “unlimited exercise of speech unrelated to action” (Valéry 1962, 215–219)—but also as 
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penetrated by a growing instrumentality of life, an encroaching regime of fact. The “surplus” 
humans of Malraux’s La Condition Humaine (1933) and the complex psychology portrayed in 
Joyce and Proust are “modern human forms,” which one would expect in such a period—
“disfigured humans,” “machine-humans” who have lost their individuality or, conversely, an 
individuality that has lost all relation to the necessities of social life.27 This particularly modern 
literature exists “as a problem of social ethics …and originates in the split and distortion of 
humanity resulting from the contradiction of Sitte and Gemüt” (Sŏ 1940, 18), leaving no self-
evidential truth available to authors in late colonial Korea and no viable option but to seek an 
emergent ethics. “The [transitional] ethos of the period is already a particular divided from the 
universal,” Sŏ writes, “a history detached from humankind…. [This sort of] simple history, 
separated from humanity, has lost [its] human truth. To say it again, [it] has lost its truth [chilli] 
objectively at the same time as [it] has lost its truth [chinsil] subjectively.” In such a situation, as 
the author “cannot grasp the true [chinsil] of the contemporary through a simple depiction of the 
prevailing ethos alone” (21), he or she “cannot but seek a new morality, a new ethical truth 
[chin]. As far as the author does not see the given ethics as a self-evident truth, a self-evident 
ethics, his interests will rightly turn to the creation of a new ethics” (19). 
The path toward what Sŏ calls a “genuine literature” must exceed the standpoint of the 
prevailing ethos through a critique of that ethos. From this point, he writes, “all the irony and 
paradox innate to literature alone will emerge as an acute means of critiquing popular customs 
[p’ungsok].” More than a turn to an ideal past or imagined future, a “panorama” of the modern is 
required; further, “an author depicting popular customs must always show intelligence and 
shrewdness in turning his lens upon the scene of this acute collusion between human nature and 
contemporary ethos” (21–22, italicized words indicate where the English term was used in the 
original text). In short, this is a call to action, or rather, a call to thought in action: when a social 
system “reaches a period of … reconstruction, having exceeded the stage of completion and 
harmony, to the extent that the already-established and fixed social system must be smashed and 
a new system must be created, action will naturally predominate over consciousness [kwansang]” 
(Sŏ [1939] 2006, 1:176).28 
“When we speak of literature’s ethicality,” Sŏ concludes, “we speak of literature’s reason 
for being. The duty of the author must then be to excavate the truth and to safeguard that truth. 
Yet insofar as the contemporary author might penetrate the truth, he or she cannot but confront 
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the entangled opposition of contemporary ethos and humanness” (1940, 22). Literature must 
grapple with and act within this historical struggle in that it takes as its object the human subject; 
against the natural sciences, literature must assume the role of understanding rather than 
explaining the volitional individual; and finally, because literary understanding is “necessarily 
limited by the historical perspective or world view of the person who is doing the understanding,” 
literature must express how the perceiving subject knows the world and his or her place in it 
([1939] 2006, 2:63). 
 
Conclusion 
Does Sŏ’s reconciliation of subjective and objective truths with a particular ethos, 
“transferring the external demands of the whole into the internal demands of each self, of 
individual constituents belonging to the whole” (Sŏ 1940, 13), differ from those promoted under 
the “total culture” (chŏnch’ejŏgin munhwa) of assimilatory empire? Given that they both appear 
to take as their goal the harmonization of the social and the individual toward the production of a 
community, does Sŏ's work reflect a colonial discourse that “makes a problem of the cultivation 
of the individual as constitutive parts of a total culture” (“Munhwa” 1939, 2) and for which 
culture is a mediating force facilitating the unilateral imposition of truth from the sociopolitical 
structure to the individual? Can we understand Sŏ’s work as counter to that of imperial 
apologists, as appealing to a “universality” beyond East Asia (C. Yi 2006)? 
First, it is important to recognize Sŏ’s careful attention to language, in both the general 
sense of the discursive basis of truth statements, and in the specific sense of a literary language 
“eccentric” to its ethos. As we have seen above, Sŏ’s treatment of objective truth as a linguistic 
phenomenon undermines science’s claim to a prediscursive factuality. At the same time, he 
understands the artist as one who expresses the disjunction between the social and the subject—
between the ethics of the community and individual morality. This arguably contrasts with 
imperialist discourse, where it is in a language comprehensible to all that culture must provide 
the presumed truth of a particular situation. There, an everyday language is brought into 
coincidence with prevailing objective conditions and functions by “unifying [Koreans] as 
imperialized citizens, educating and training [them] in spirit, in thought, in feeling” (In 1940, 4). 
An imperialist literary language mediates a pregiven truth into the affective realm of everyday 
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communication, where it becomes experienced as common knowledge or common sense, the 
“matter of fact.” 
Second, for Sŏ the action of “understanding” (as opposed to “knowledge”) takes into 
account the agency of the subject and the potential for a powerful and ethical literary language to 
emerge. In a situation of social antagonism, the language of the artist will be “eccentric” to that 
situation's pragmatic factuality and as a consequence able to work to change the expressible or 
“known” of that situation. 
Third, while it may seem obvious, attention should be drawn to Sŏ’s insistence on a 
dialectical model that does not necessarily prefigure the coming social formation. This is in 
contrast to an imperial discourse that enforces the “cultivation of the individual as a constitutive 
part of total culture” in line with an “accord” that is already known to begin with (see also Ch’ae 
2006)—where the desired social order precedes and determines its emergence in subjective 
consciousness, while the construction of a social whole is understood in positive and particular 
terms. Sŏ, rather, understands the process as a series of negations, and as universal. 
Sŏ’s late colonial writings on literature can thus be seen as a response to the dilemmas of 
subjectivity and objectivity in language faced by intellectuals in colonial Korea, situated within a 
dialectical conceptualization of historical progress. If both scientific and colonial discourses 
strive toward fixity and identification (of object and subject, respectively), then Sŏ introduces 
what Homi Bhabha, following Edward Said, describes as “the counter-pressure of the diachrony 
of history—change, difference” (Bhabha 1994, 122). Sǒ's work on colonial literature intervenes 
in a number of ways in a system of factual representation that, as “a regime of truth,… 
structurally similar to realism,” produces the colonized “as a social reality which is at once an 
‘other’ and yet entirely knowable and visible” (Bhabha 1994, 101): he undermines the “objective 
truth” of scientific or official discourse, that which seeks “identity, stasis”; locates subjective 
experience as position of power within a historical-material dialectic; and posits both a subject 
“eccentric” to the apparent social totality and a form of expression (literature) that, in 
encompassing both subjective and objective forms of truth particular to that subject's social 
formation, registers the disjunction or opposition between “official” culture and the subjective 
experience of that culture.   
This can only be speculation on our part, as Sǒ does not raise the issue of colonial society 
explicitly, but it is hard to resist understanding Sǒ’s theorization of a literary practice “eccentric” 
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to its present moment—one that expresses the constitutive disjuncture between a given discourse 
and subjective experience—as related to a critique of the colonial context and its legitimizing 
discourse. Sŏ moves beyond the binary opposition characteristic of his literary historical context, 
the distinction between the literary text understood as the autonomous product of a subject 
disengaged from his or her context and the literary text understood as determined by (or a direct 
correlative of) its historical period or sociocultural context. For Sŏ an “ethical literature” rests on 
the idea of literary truth as a dialectical negation of purported scientific objectivity (a method of 
description that denies the mediating role of language) and the sublation of an abstract 
universality by the subjective, concrete participation in and depiction of a particular social ethos. 
In this way Sŏ provides a subtle critique of two assumptions: first, of the scientific truth behind 
frequently racialized discourses of empire used to justify ongoing colonization and war, and 
second, of an instrumentalized literature understood as mediation between the total culture of 
empire and the systematic production of truth and belief at the experiential level (In 1940). Sǒ 
thus understands the importance of language as an object of critique when it functions as a 
powerful accomplice of identificatory discourse, but also its significance to social transformation, 
where literature stands not only as the site of the production of truth but also as the potential site 
of politics. 
 
Christopher P. Hanscom is assistant professor in the Department of Asian Languages and 
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Notes 
 
1 Quoted in Seth (2009, 374). Kim Ch’ŏl’s work on the advent and role of physical 
anthropology in colonial Korea as an imperial science of race similarly finds that “this 
racial outlook (which was broadly shared by both the colonizers and the colonized), 
rather than strengthening and clarifying the boundaries between Japanese and Koreans as 
initially intended, actually became a source of tension and unease threatening that same 
‘boundary’” (2013, 3). 
2 My thanks to Paul Barclay for pointing me to this article. 
3 For Thomas, recognition, when “we see and make determinations about what we are 
seeing before we are conscious of doing so,” is precognitive. Excavation, on the other 
hand, is an interpretive mode that treats sight itself “as an experience located within 
historically specific regimes of knowledge” (2009, 152). 
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4 Sŏ Insik was born in Hamhŭng in 1906 and graduated from the Kyŏngsŏng Private 
Central (High) Normal School before studying philosophy at Waseda University (1926–
1928), where he acquired “a long-term interest…in the relation between human 
consciousness and action, and their dialectical synthesis.” He became a practicing 
Marxist-Leninist and an activist in the Korean Communist Party during the late 1920s 
and early 1930s before being arrested by colonial authorities in November 1931 and 
jailed for five years following his trial in 1933. Released in 1937, he began publishing 
philosophically oriented pieces that evinced a link with Kyoto School philosophers, 
including Miki Kiyoshi and Nishida Kitarō, and earned the appellation “leading 
philosopher” in a Chosŏn ilbo article in 1940. Soon after this, following an interview with 
the journal Chogwang, Sŏ ceased writing altogether and confined himself to a private 
existence. Details about his activities in the postliberation period are mostly unknown, 
though there is evidence that he participated in several groups formed in the “liberation 
space” by former members of the leftist Korea Artista Proleta Federatio (KAPF) (Ch’a 
2006). Ch’a speculates that Sŏ went to the North and later fled to the Soviet Union, but it 
is difficult to confirm any facts from this period. 
5 Or, per Valéry, “things themselves speaking.” In this sense facticity is a form of realism 
that elides language or treats it as a transparent medium, as does scientific discourse (see 
Barthes 1986, 4). 
6 More than just homophones, each term is realist in the sense that a correlation is implied 
between (literary, scientific, and historical) language and the object or matter at hand. 
7 “Perception” here is insik, also translatable as “knowing” or “understanding.” 
8 Or, as Husserl puts it, in considering the role of the subjective in the objective sciences: 
“fact-minded sciences” exclude the most important questions, the “questions of the 
meaning of meaninglessness of the whole of this human existence” (1970, 6). 
9 Valéry’s “century of fact,” as Ch’a points out, was taken out of context and became a 
commonplace for the “world-historical significance” of the formation of the East Asian 
order—an omen of civilizational change—imported into Korea through Japan as a sort of 
slogan (Ch’a 2012, 33). 
10 Yi is paraphrasing Ryu Chesik (1983, 103). 
11 In this sense, history is mythical in Valéry’s thought: “To the extent that a historical 
account contains elements which are not open to verification and which are nevertheless 
the object of an attitude of belief, the perspective is mythical” (Champigny 1970, 211).  
12 An Hamgwang (1910–1982) was an early member of KAPF and wŏlbuk critic (one who 
“went north” after liberation) who was purged as an anti-Party, antirevolutionary 
revisionist in 1967 when he opposed the systematization of Juche ideology (H. Yi 2006, 
222). 
13 In keeping with this, Benda writes that “men to-day are displaying, with a hitherto 
unknown knowledge and consciousness, the desire to situate themselves in the real or 
practical manner of existence, in opposition to the disinterested or metaphysical manner” 
(Benda [1928] 2009, 37). 
14 This leads to a working definition of “facts” as “desires that have been realized,” as with 
Benda’s assertion (quoting Paul Bourget): “A truly scientific mind feels no need to justify 
a privilege which appears as an elementary and irreducible datum of the social world” 
([1928] 2009, 120n2). Benda points out that it is only when a privilege is threatened (i.e., 
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the fulfilled desire is questioned) that the “scientific mind” feels compelled to justify that 
privilege. 
15 Bergson calls this powerful, unseen force “the totality of obligation” and encapsulates its 
command to the subject in the phrase “You must because you must.” As Slavoj Žižek has 
it: “We know there is no truth in authority, yet we continue to play its game and to obey it 
in order not to disturb the usual run of things” (1992, x). Sŏ explicitly references the 
Bergsonian “closed society” in his 1940 “Literature and Ethics.” 16	   Sŏ later draws on Georg Simmel’s distinction between Mehr-Leben (“more-life”) and 
Mehr-als-Leben (“more-than-life”) to develop the idea of the relation between the 
(universal) human subject and his or her position within a (particular) social context. 
“More-life” is the process of human reproduction, whereas “more-than-life” rests in the 
process of creating something beyond simple life (art, religion, law, knowledge), which 
has a law and logic of its own and which ultimately comes to structure and restrict the 
raw creative potential of the human being, a form imposed on the content of life (1940, 
15). See Simmel ([1918] 2011). It is crucial to note here that for Sŏ the individual is a 
social being. As Marx wrote, “His life, even if it may not appear in the direct form of a 
communal life carried out together with others—is therefore an expression and 
confirmation of social life…. Man, much as he may therefore be a particular 
individual…is just as much the totality—the ideal totality—the subjective existence of 
thought and experienced society present for itself” (1978, 86). This materialist stance, 
which Sŏ arguably shares, has often been contrasted with a Hegelian idealism that locates 
the ethical in the ideal state, “the union of the universal essential will and the subjective 
will” (Hegel 1988, 41). 
17 This is in keeping with Sŏ’s dual vision of history: “History-as-being binds, seizes, in its 
own terminal system, the continual order [Reihe] of history-as-action that always 
accompanies and takes part in it; and history-as-action accompanies the continuous 
system of history-as-being, always rupturing it—[thus these two] progress [while 
coexisting and acting on one another].” History-as-being correlates with “enclosures of 
tradition, built up over thousands of years”; history-as-action, following Nietzsche, 
strikes a present-centered stance that gives the “strength to smash the old and create the 
new” (Sŏ [1939] 2006, 1:173–175). 
18 The relevant quotation from Aristotle is: “It is not the function of the poet to relate what 
has happened, but what may happen—what is possible according to the law of probability 
or necessity. The poet and the historian differ not by writing in verse or in prose…. The 
true difference is that one relates what has happened, the other what may happen. Poetry, 
therefore, is a more philosophical and a higher thing than history: for poetry tends to 
express the universal, history the particular” (Aristotle 1951, 35). 
19 The original text reads: “Sasang ŭi chin kwa wi rŭl sikpyŏlhago p’andanhanŭn chagyong 
ŭl ttŏnasŏ insik e pyŏlgae ŭi kinŭngi itnŭn kŏsi anida.” (事像의眞과僞를 識別하고 
判斷하는 作用을 떠나서 認識에 別個의 機能이 있는것이 아니다) (Sŏ 1940, 7). 
“Phenomenon” in its philosophical sense is usually rendered as hyŏnsang, which 
corresponds to Hegel’s Erscheinung; sasang could also be translated here as “object” or 
“event.” 
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20 Sŏ’s treatment of “scientific truth” or knowing resembles Hegel’s concept of 
“understanding” (Verstand), which suggests the abstract, formal thought of the empirical 
sciences. “The defect of the Understanding,” writes T. M. Knox in his foreword to 
Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, “is that while it correctly distinguishes between form and 
content, essential and inessential, universal and particular, it fails to synthesize these 
opposites. Held apart from one another, however, each of these opposites becomes an 
abstraction, and the living whole of reality has not been explained but explained away 
and killed by being so analysed into its constituents. What the Understanding fails to 
recognize is that a ‘thought’ is not something empty or abstract; it is a determinant, a 
determinant of itself” (Knox 1967, viii). Sŏ treats the gap between thought and action at 
length in “Action and Consciousness in History” ([1939] 2006, 1:173–189). 
21 Literature is here more than a vehicle for the revelation of a truth that preexists its 
apprehension in language. For Sŏ, ethical truth is produced in language, in the application 
of language to the experience and description of a particular social ethos and its 
contradictions, distortions, and so on. In this sense the “movement of truth” is the 
production of truth in language—Sŏ finds truth to be a characteristic not only of 
phenomena but of knowledge as well. 
22 Sŏ uses the term kwanhaeng to represent the particular popular customs and conventions 
of a period, rather than kwansŭp, which signifies a universal or communal ethics 
(Sittlichkeit). Sŏ is here taking part in larger debates centered on the question of the 
(personal, communal, or temporal) specificity of literature that occupied intellectual 
circles in late 1930s and early 1940s Korea. 
23 Sŏ also refers to this sense in the author as a “mentality” or “spirit” (chŏngsin). Here we 
see an objectivity arising not from the correct depiction of objects in the world, but 
through the expression of the organizing structure of a particular society. 
24 Heidegger locates these two commonplace forms of truth in the formulations veritas est 
adaequatio rei et intellectus (truth is the correspondence of the matter to knowledge) and 
veritas est adaequatio intellectus ad rem (truth is the adequation of intellect to thing). He 
goes on to show that the former is ultimately a theological explanation, with “knowledge” 
as the divine plan of creation (supplanted more recently by a “world order,” or “worldly 
reason”) against which matter must be measured (1967, 138–139). 
25 In the remainder of the essay, Sŏ works toward a description of the relationship between 
literature and society. In short, literature functions according to the subjective morality 
(Moralität) of the author, which, in periods where the prevailing ethos stands at odds with 
the practice and experience of everyday life, comes into conflict and dialectical 
interaction with that ethos and works to produce a new ethical community (kwansŭp, G. 
Sittlichkeit) through its critical apprehension of actuality. It is important to note that Sŏ is 
not writing of absolute truth but of local, temporary truth, specific to its era and society—
a truth still caught up in the dialectic of history that “remains ‘true’ as long as a new 
philosophy, also ‘true,’ does not come along to demonstrate its ‘error’” (Kojève [1969] 
1980, 184). 
26 See Hanscom (2013), especially chapter 1, on theories of crisis utilized by literary critics 
across the ideological spectrum to describe the social and discursive contexts faced by 
writers and intellectuals in colonial Korea. 
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27 Expanding on the relationship between social form and individual type in periods of 
transition, Sŏ writes that “the mind of human beings living within this sort of daily life, 
particularly with regards to the psychology of the author, will have a great interest in and 
excessive fondness for incompletion over completion, imbalance over balance, a loss of 
stability over stability, movement over stillness, risk over moderation, illness over health” 
(Sŏ 1940, 17–18). Here again Sŏ engages with debates among critics of the period, such 
as Im Hwa, Ch’oe Chaesŏ, An Hamgwang, and Kim Namch’ŏn, over the relationship 
between the author, literature, and sociopolitical reality. 
28 Sŏ uses different terms for “behavior,” within social codes or boundaries (haengdong), 
and “action,” which breaks with or operates outside of standards and norms (haengwi) 
([1939] 2006, 1:178). 
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